Tag Archives: valgrind

curl is C

Every once in a while someone suggests to me that curl and libcurl would do better if rewritten in a “safe language”. Rust is one such alternative language commonly suggested. This happens especially often when we publish new security vulnerabilities. (Update: I think Rust is a fine language! This post and my stance here has nothing to do with what I think about Rust or other languages, safe or not.)

curl is written in C

The curl code guidelines mandate that we stick to using C89 for any code to be accepted into the repository. C89 (sometimes also called C90) – the oldest possible ANSI C standard. Ancient and conservative.

C is everywhere

This fact has made it possible for projects, companies and people to adopt curl into things using basically any known operating system and whatever CPU architecture you can think of (at least if it was 32bit or larger). No other programming language is as widespread and easily available for everything. This has made curl one of the most portable projects out there and is part of the explanation for curl’s success.

The curl project was also started in the 90s, even long before most of these alternative languages you’d suggest, existed. Heck, for a truly stable project it wouldn’t be responsible to go with a language that isn’t even old enough to start school yet.

Everyone knows C

Perhaps not necessarily true anymore, but at least the knowledge of C is very widespread, where as the current existing alternative languages for sure have more narrow audiences or amount of people that master them.

C is not a safe language

Does writing safe code in C require more carefulness and more “tricks” than writing the same code in a more modern language better designed to be “safe” ? Yes it does. But we’ve done most of that job already and maintaining that level isn’t as hard or troublesome.

We keep scanning the curl code regularly with static code analyzers (we maintain a zero Coverity problems policy) and we run the test suite with valgrind and address sanitizers.

C is not the primary reason for our past vulnerabilities

There. The simple fact is that most of our past vulnerabilities happened because of logical mistakes in the code. Logical mistakes that aren’t really language bound and they would not be fixed simply by changing language.

Of course that leaves a share of problems that could’ve been avoided if we used another language. Buffer overflows, double frees and out of boundary reads etc, but the bulk of our security problems has not happened due to curl being written in C.

C is not a new dependency

It is easy for projects to add a dependency on a library that is written in C since that’s what operating systems and system libraries are written in, still today in 2017. That’s the default. Everyone can build and install such libraries and they’re used and people know how they work.

A library in another language will add that language (and compiler, and debugger and whatever dependencies a libcurl written in that language would need) as a new dependency to a large amount of projects that are themselves written in C or C++ today. Those projects would in many cases downright ignore and reject projects written in “an alternative language”.

curl sits in the boat

In the curl project we’re deliberately conservative and we stick to old standards, to remain a viable and reliable library for everyone. Right now and for the foreseeable future. Things that worked in curl 15 years ago still work like that today. The same way. Users can rely on curl. We stick around. We don’t knee-jerk react to modern trends. We sit still in the boat. We don’t rock it.

Rewriting means adding heaps of bugs

The plain fact, that also isn’t really about languages but is about plain old software engineering: translating or rewriting curl into a new language will introduce a lot of bugs. Bugs that we don’t have today.

Not to mention how rewriting would take a huge effort and a lot of time. That energy can instead today be spent on improving curl further.

What if

If I would start the project today, would I’ve picked another language? Maybe. Maybe not. If memory safety and related issues was the primary concern I had, then sure. But as I’ve mentioned above there are several others concerns too so it would really depend on my priorities.

Finally

At the end of the day the question that remains is: would we gain more than we would pay, and over which time frame? Who would gain and who would lose?

I’m sure that there will be or it may even already exist, curl and libcurl competitors and potent alternatives written in most of these new alternative languages. Some of them are absolutely really good and will get used and reach fame and glory. Some of them will be crap. Just like software always work. Let a thousand curl competitors bloom!

Will curl be rewritten at some point in the future? I won’t rule it out, but I find it unlikely. I find it even more unlikely that it will happen in the short term or within the next few years.

Discuss this post on Hacker news or Reddit!

Followup-post: Yes, C is unsafe, but…

6 hours of bliss

I sent out the release announcement for curl 7.52.0 exactly 07:59 in the morning of December 21, 2016. A Wednesday. We typically  release curl on Wednesdays out of old habit. It is a good release day.

curl 7.52.0 was just as any other release. Perhaps with a slightly larger set of new features than what’s typical for us. We introduce TLS 1.3 support, we now provide HTTPS-proxy support and the command line tool has this option called –fail-early that I think users will start to appreciate once they start to discover it. We also  announced three fixed security vulnerabilities. And some other good things.

I pushed the code to git, signed and uploaded the tarballs, I updated the info on the web site and I sent off that release announcement email and I felt good. Release-time good. That short feeling of relief and starting over on a new slate that I often experience these release days. Release days make me happy.

Any bets?

It is not unusual for someone to find a bug really fast after a release has shipped. As I was feeling good, I had to joke in the #curl IRC channel (42 minutes after that email):

08:41 <bagder> any bets on when the first bug report on the new release shows up? =)

Hours passed and maybe, just maybe there was not going to be any quick bugs filed on this release?

But of course. I wouldn’t write this blog post if it all had been nice and dandy. At 14:03, I got the email. 6 hours and 4 minutes since I wrote the 7.52.0 announcement email.

The email was addressed to the curl project security email list and included a very short patch and explanation how the existing code is wrong and needs “this fix” to work correctly. And it was entirely correct!

Now I didn’t feel that sense of happiness anymore. For some reason it was now completely gone and instead I felt something that involved sensations like rage, embarrassment and general tiredness. How the [beep] could this slip through like this?

I’ve done releases in the past that were broken to various extents but this is a sort of a new record and an unprecedented event. Enough time had passed that I couldn’t just yank the package from the download page either. I had to take it through the correct procedures.

What happened?

As part of a general code cleanup during this last development round, I changed all the internals to use a proper internal API to get random data and if libcurl is built with a TLS library it uses its provided API to get secure and safe random data. As a move to improve our use of random internally. We use this internal API for getting the nonce in authentication mechanisms such as Digest and NTLM and also for generating the boundary string in HTTP multipart formposts and more. (It is not used for any TLS or SSH level protocol stuff though.)

I did the largest part of the random overhaul of this in commit f682156a4f, just a little over a month ago.

Of course I made sure that all test cases kept working and there were no valgrind reports or anything, the code didn’t cause any compiler warnings. It did not generate any reports in the many clang-analyzer or Coverity static code analyzer runs we’ve done since. We run clang-analyzer daily and Coverity perhaps weekly.

But there’s a valgrind report just here!

Kamil Dudka, who sent the 14:03 email, got a valgrind error and that’s what set him off – but how come he got that and I didn’t?

The explanation consists of the following two conditions that together worked to hide the problem for us quite successfully:

  1. I (and I suppose several of the other curl hackers) usually build curl and libcurl “debug enabled”. This allows me to run more tests, do more diagnostics and debug it easier when I run into problems. It also provides a system with “fake random” so that we can actually verify that functions that otherwise use real random values generate the correct output when given a known random value… and yeah, this debug system prevented valgrind from detecting any problem!
  2. In the curl test suite we once had a problem with valgrind generating reports on third party libraries etc which then ended up as false positives. We then introduced a “valgrind report parser” that would detect if the report concerns curl or something else. It turns out this parser doesn’t detect the errors if curl is compiled without the cc’s -g command line option. And of course… curl and libcurl both build without -g by default!

The patch?

The vulnerable function basically uses this simple prototype. It is meant to get an “int” worth of random value stored in the buffer ‘rnd’ points to. That’s 4 bytes.

randit(struct Curl_easy *data, unsigned int *rnd)

But due to circumstances I can’t explain on anything other than my sloppy programming, I managed to write the function store random value in the actual pointer instead of the buffer it points to. So when the function returns, there’s nothing stored in the buffer. No 4 bytes of random. Just the uninitialized value of whatever happened to be there, on the stack.

The patch that fixes this problem looks like this (with some names shortened to simplify but keep the idea):

- res = random(data, (char *)&rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ res = random(data, (char *)rnd, sizeof(*rnd));

So yeah. I introduced this security flaw in 7.52.0. We had it fixed in 7.52.1, released roughly 48 hours later.

(I really do not need comments on what other languages that wouldn’t have allowed this mistake or otherwise would’ve brought us world peace a long time ago.)

Make it not happen again

The primary way to make this same mistake not happen again easily, is that I’m removing the valgrind report parsing function from the test suite and we will now instead assume that valgrind reports will be legitimate and if not, work on suppressing the false positives in a better way.

References

This flaw is officially known as CVE-2016-9594

The real commit that fixed this problem is here, or as stand-alone patch.

The full security advisory for this flaw is here: https://curl.haxx.se/docs/adv_20161223.html

Facepalm photo by Alex E. Proimos.

xkcd: 221