The big protocols

Sunday, January 24th, 2010

OWASP Sweden once again arranged another interesting meeting, this time with three talks.owasp

The title of the meeting on January 21st here in Stockholm called the protocols “the big ones” (but in Swedish) but I have no idea what kind of measurement they’ve used or what the small ones are or what other “big protocols” there might be! ;-)

First we got to hear Håvard Eidnes tell us about BGP and that protocol seems to suffer from its share of security problems with the protocol itself but perhaps even more with the actual implementations as one of the bigger recent BGP-related incidents that was spoken about was about how internal routes were leaked to the outside from Pakistan in Feb 2008 which made them block the entire world’s access to Youtube. This talk also gave us some insights on the “wild west” of international routing and the lack of control and proper knowledge about who’s allowed to route what to where.

There then was a session by Rickard Bellgrim about DNSSEC and even though I’ve heard talks about this protocol in the past I couldn’t but to again feel that man they have a lot of terminology in that world that makes even a basic description fairly hard to keep up with in some parts of it all. And man do they have a lot of signing and keys and fingerprints and trusts going on… Of course DNSSEC is the answer to lots of existing problems with DNS and DNSSEC certainly opens up a range of new fun. The idea to somehow replace the need for ca-certs by storing keys in DNS is interesting, but even though technically working and sound I fear the browser vendors and the CAs of the SSL world won’t be very fast to turn the wheels to roll in that direction. DNSSEC certainly makes name resolving a lot more complicated, and I wonder if c-ares should ever get into that game… And BTW, DNSSEC of course doesn’t take away the fact that specific implementations may still be vulnerable to security flaws.

The last talk of the evening was about SSL, or rather TLS, held by Fredrik Hesse. He gave us a pretty detailed insight into how the protocol works, and then a fairly detailed overview of the flaws discovered during the last year or so, primarily MD5 and rogue ca certs, the null-prefix cert names and the TLS renegotiation bug. I felt good about already knowing just about everything of what he told us. I can also boast with having corrected the speaker afterward at the pub where we were having our post-talk-beers as he was evidently very OpenSSL focused when he spoke about what SSL libraries can and cannot do.

A great evening. And with good beers too. Thanks to the organizers!

The IPv6 failure being joined by DNSSEC?

Wednesday, February 27th, 2008

In case you haven’t read it before, Randy Bush’s 55 page PDF slide show named “IPv6 Transition & Operational Reality” is a harsh (but quite accurate) description of how the IPv6 protocol was made, where some of its major problems lie and why the transition is going so slow etc.

I tried to find some official and recent figures or statements from some of the more IPv6-positive people and companies, but I failed to find much updates from after the year 2000 or so…

Speaking of network things that aren’t so successfully deployed: DNSSEC. Apparently iis.se (runs the Swedish TLD) tested 10 broadband routers (article and PDF in Swedish only) how well they support this (I believe mainly because .se tries to be a pioneer in DNSSEC), and 7 of the tested ones failed… Personally I’ve never liked the fact that DNSSEC isn’t really crafted to do it securely all the way.