Tag Archives: cURL and libcurl

Increased CVE activity in curl?

Recently I have received curious questions from users, customers and bystanders.

Can you explain the seemingly increased CVE activity in curl over like the last year or so?

(data and stats for this post comes mostly from the curl dashboard)

Pointless but related poll I ran on Twitter

Frequency

In 2022 we have already had 14 CVEs reported so far, and we will announce the 15th when we release curl 7.85.0 at the end of August. Going into September 2022, there have been a total of 18 reported CVEs in the last 12 months.

During the whole of 2021 we had 13 CVEs reported – and already that was a large amount and the most CVEs in a single year since 2016.

There has clearly been an increased CVE issue rate in curl as of late.

Finding and fixing problems is good

While every reported security problem stings my ego and makes my soul hurt since it was yet another mistake I feel I should have found or not made in the first place, the key take away is still that it is good that they are found and reported so that they can be fixed properly. Ideally, we also learn something from each such report and make it less likely that we ever introduce that (kind of) problem again.

That might be the absolutely hardest task around each CVE. To figure out what went wrong, detect a pattern and then lock it down. It’s almost amusing how all bugs look a like a one-off mistake with nothing to learn from…

Ironically, the only way we know people are looking really hard at curl security is when someone reports security problems. If there was no reports at all, can we really be sure that people are scrutinizing the code the way we want?

Who is counting?

Counting the amount of CVEs and giving that a meaning, or even comparing the number between projects, is futile and a bad idea. The number does not say much and comparing two projects this way is impossible and will not tell you anything. Every project is unique.

Just counting CVEs disregards the fact that they all have severity levels. Are they a dozen “severity low” or are they a handful of critical ones? Even if you take severity into account, they might have gotten entirely different severity for virtually the same error, or vice versa.

Further, some projects attract more scrutinize and investigation because they are considered more worthwhile targets. Or perhaps they just pay researchers more for their findings. Projects that don’t get the same amount of focus will naturally get fewer security problems reported for them, which does not necessarily mean that they have fewer problems.

Incentives

The curl bug-bounty really works as an incentive as we do reward security researchers a sizable amount of money for every confirmed security flaw they report. Recently, we have handed over 2,400 USD for each Medium-severity security problem.

In addition to that, finding and getting credited for finding a flaw in a widespread product such as curl is also seen as an extra “feather in the hat” for a lot of security-minded bug hunters.

Over the last year alone, we have paid about 30,000 USD in bug bounty rewards to security researchers, summing up a total of over 40,000 USD since the program started.

Accumulated bug-bounty rewards for curl CVEs over time

Who’s looking?

We have been fortunate to have received the attention of some very skilled, patient and knowledgeable individuals. To find security problems in modern curl, the best bug hunters both know the ins and outs of the curl project source code itself while at the same time they know the protocols curl speaks to a deep level. That’s how you can find mismatches that shouldn’t be there and that could lead to security problems.

The 15 reports we have received in 2022 so far (including the pending one) have been reported by just four individuals. Two of them did one each, the other two did 87% of the reporting. Harry Sintonen alone reported 60% of them.

Hardly any curl security problems are found with source code analyzers or even fuzzers these days. Those low hanging fruits have already been picked.

We care, we act

Our average response time for security reports sent to the curl project has been less than two hours during 2022, for the 56 reports received so far.

We give each report a thorough investigation and we spend a serious amount of time and effort to really make sure we understand all the angles of the claim, that it really is a security problem, that we produce the best possible fix for it and not the least: that we produce a mighty fine advisory for the issue that explains it to the world with detail and accuracy.

Less than 8% of the submissions we get are eventually confirmed actual security problems.

As a general rule all security problems we confirm, are fixed in the pending next release. The only acceptable exception would be if the report arrives just a day or two from the next release date.

We work hard to make curl more secure and to use more ways of writing secure code and tools to detect mistakes than ever, to minimize the risk for introducing security flaws.

Judge a project on how it acts

Since you cannot judge a project by the number of CVEs that come out of it, what you should instead pay more focus on when you assess the health of a software project is how it acts when security problems are reported.

Most problems are still very old

In the curl project we make a habit of tracing back and figuring out exactly in which release each and every security problem was once introduced. Often the exact commit. (Usually that commit was authored by me, but let’s not linger on that fact now.)

One fun thing this allows us to do, is to see how long time the offending code has been present in releases. The period during which all the eyeballs that presumably glanced over the code missed the fact that there was a security bug in there.

On average, curl security problems have been present an extended period of time before there are found and reported.

On average for all CVEs: 2,867 days

The average time bugs were present for CVEs reported during the last 12 months is a whopping 3,245 days. This is very close to nine years.

How many people read the code in those nine years?

The people who find security bugs do not know nor do they care about the age of a source code line when they dig up the problems. The fact that the bugs are usually old could be an indication that we introduced more security bugs in the past than we do now.

Finding vs introducing

Enough about finding issues for a moment. Let’s talk about introducing security problems. I already mentioned we track down exactly when security flaws were introduced. We know.

All CVEs in curl, green are found, red are introduced

With this, we can look at the trend and see if we are improving over time.

The project has existed for almost 25 years, which means that if we introduce problems spread out evenly over time, we would have added 4% of them every year. About 5 CVE problems are introduced per year on average. So, being above or below 5 introduced makes us above or below an average year.

Bugs are probably not introduced as a product of time, but more as a product of number of lines of code or perhaps as a ratio of the commits.

75% of the CVE errors were introduced before March 2014 – and yet the code base “only” had 102,000 lines of code at the end of that period. At that time, we had done 61% of the git commits (17684). One CVE per 189 commits.

15% of the security problems were introduced during the last five years and now we are at 148,000 lines of code. Finding needles in a growing haystack. With more code than ever before, we introduce bugs at a lower-than average rate. One CVE per 352 commits. This probably is also related to the ever-growing number of tests and CI jobs that help us detect more problems before we merge them.

Number of lines of code. Includes comments, excludes blank lines

The commit rate has remained between 1,100 and 1,700 commits per year since 2007 with ups and downs but no obvious growing or declining trend.

Number of commits per year

Harry Sintonen

Harry reported a large amount of the recent curl CVEs as mentioned above, and is credited for a total of 17 reported curl CVEs – no one else is even close to that track record. I figured it is apt to ask him about the curl situation of today, to make sure this is not just me hallucinating things up. What do you think is the reason for the increased number of CVEs in curl in 2022?

Harry replied:

  1. The news of good bounties being paid likely has been attracting more researchers to look at curl.
  2. I did put considerable effort in doing code reviews. I’m sure some other people put in a lot of effort too.
  3. When a certain before unseen type of vulnerability is found, it will attract people to look at the code as a whole for similar or surrounding issues. This quite often results in new, similar CVEs bundling up. This is kind of a clustering effect.

It’s worth mentioning, I think, that even though there has been more CVEs found recently, they have been found (well most of them at least) as part of the bug bounty program and get handled in a controlled manner. While it would be even better to have no vulnerabilities at all, finding and handling them in controlled manner is the 2nd best option.

This might be escaping a random observer who just looks at the recent amount of CVEs and goes “oh this is really bad – something must have gone wrong!”. Some of the issues are rather old and were only found now due to the increased attention.

Conclusion

We introduce CVE problems at a slower rate now than we did in the past even though we have gotten problems reported at a higher than usual frequency recently.

The way I see it, we are good. I suppose the future will tell if I am right.

The curl release cycle

In the curl project we do timed releases and we try to do them planned and scheduled long in advance. The dates are planned. The content is not.

I have been the release manager for every single curl release done. 209 releases at current count. Having this role means I make sure things are in decent shape for releases and I do the actual mechanic act of running the release scripts etc on the release days.

Since 2014, we make releases on Wednesdays, every eight weeks. We sometimes adjust the date slightly because of personal events (meaning: if I have a vacation when the release is about to happen, we can move it), and we have done several patch releases within a shorter time when the previous release proved to have a serious enough problem to warrant an out-of-schedule release. Even more specifically, I make the releases available at or around 8 am (central euro time) on the release days.

The main objective is to stick to the 56 day interval.

It probably goes without saying but let me be clear: curl is a software project that quite evidently will never be done or complete. It will keep getting fixes, improvements and features for as long as it lives, and as long as it lives we keep making new releases.

Timed releases

We decided to go with a fixed eight weeks release frequency quite arbitrarily (based on past release history and what felt “right”) but it has over time proved to work well. It is short enough for everyone to never have to wait very long for the next release, and yet it is long enough to give us time for both merging new features and having a period of stabilization.

Timed releases means that we ship releases on the predetermined release date with all the existing features and bugfixes that have landed in the master branch in time. If a change is not done in time and it is not merged before the release, it will simply not be included in the release but will get a new opportunity to get included and shipped in the next release. Forever and ever.

I am a proponent of timed releases compared to feature based ones for projects like curl. For the simplicity of managing the releases, for long term planning, for user communication and more.

The cycle has three windows

Within the eight week release cycle, there are three distinct and different windows or phases.

1 – release margin

The cycle can be said to start at the day of a release. The release is created straight from the master git branch. It gets signed, uploaded, blogged about and the news of it is shouted across the globe.

This day also starts the “release margin window”. In this window we still accept and merge bugfixes into the master branch, but we do not merge changes or new features.

The five day margin this speaks of, is that this window gives us a few calendar days to assess and get a feel for how the previous release is being received. Is there a serious bug reported? Did we somehow royally mess up? If we did an important enough snafu, we may decide to do a follow-up patch release soon and if we do, we are in a better position if we have not merged any changes yet into the release branch.

If we decide on doing a patch release, we skip the feature window and go directly to feature freeze.

2 – feature window

If we survived the margin window without anything alarming happening, we open the feature window. On the Monday following the preceding release.

This is the phase during which we merge changes and new features in addition to the regular normal bugfixes (assuming there are any of course). Things that warrant the minor version number for the next release to get bumped.

The feature window is open 23 days. Ideally, people have already been working and polishing on their pull-requests for a while before this window opens and then the work can get merged fairly quickly – and presumably painless.

What exactly can be considered a change and what is a bugfix can of course become a matter of opinion and discussion, but we tend to take the safer approach when in doubt.

3 – feature freeze

In the 28 days before the pending release we only merge bugfixes into the master branch. All features and changes are queued up and will have to wait until the feature window opens again. (Exceptions might be made for experimental and off-by-default features.)

This phase is of course intended for things to calm down, to smooth out rough edges, to fix any leftover mistakes done in the previous feature merges. With the mindset that the pending next release will be the best, most stable, shiniest, glorious release we ever did. With even fewer bugs than before. The next release is always our best release yet.

The release cycle as an image

(Yes, if you squint and roll your chair away from the screen a bit, it looks like the Chrome logo!)

Release frequency graph

The graph below shows the number of days between all curl releases ever done. You can see the eight week release cycle introduced in 2014 visible in the graph, and you can also easily spot that we have done much quicker releases than eight weeks a number of a times since then – all of them actually a sign of some level of failure since that means we felt urged to do a patch release sooner than we had previously anticipated.

QUIC and HTTP/3 with wolfSSL

Disclaimer: I work for wolfSSL but I don’t speak for wolfSSL. I state my own opinions and I try to be as honest and transparent as possible. As always.

QUIC API

Back in the summer of 2020 I blogged about QUIC support coming in wolfSSL. That work never actually took off, primarily I believe because the team kept busy with other projects and tasks that had more customer focus and interest and yeah, there was not really any noticeable customer demand for QUIC with wolfSSL.

Time passed.

On July 21 2022, Stefan Eissing submitted his work on introducing a QUIC API and after reviews and updates, it was merged into the wolfSSL master branch on August 9th.

The QUIC API is planned to appear “for real” in a coming wolfSSL release version. Until then, we can play with what is available in git.

Let me be clear here: the good people at wolfSSL has not decided to write a full QUIC implementation, because that would be insane when so many good alternatives are already being worked on. This is just a set of new functions to allow wolfSSL to be used as TLS component when a QUIC stack is created.

Having QUIC support in wolfSSL is just one (but important) step along the way as it makes it possible to use wolfSSL to build a QUIC implementation but there are some more steps needed to turn this baby into full HTTP/3.

ngtcp2

Luckily, ngtcp2 exists and it is an established QUIC implementation that was written to be TLS agnostic from the beginning. This “only” needs adaptions provided to make sure it can be built and used with wolSSL as the TLS provider.

Stefan brought wolfSSL support to ngtcp2 in this PR. Merged on August 13th.

nghttp3

nghttp3 is the HTTP/3 library that uses ngtcp2 for QUIC, so once ngtcp2 supports wolfSSL we can use nghttp3 to do HTTP/3.

curl

curl can (as one of the available options) get built to use nghttp3 for HTTP/3, and if we just make sure we use an underlying ngtcp2 built to use a wolfSSL version with QUIC support, we can now do proper curl HTTP/3 transfers powered by wolfSSL.

Stefan made it possible to build curl with the wolfSSL+ngtcp2 combo in this PR. Merged on August 15th.

Available HTTP/3 components

With this new ecosystem addition, the chart of HTTP/3 components for curl did not get any easier to parse!

If you start by selecting which HTTP/3 library (or maybe I should call it HTTP/3 vertical) to use when building, there are three available options to go with: quiche, msh3 or nghttp3. Depending on that choice, the QUIC library is given. quiche does QUIC as well, but the two other HTTP/3 libraries use dedicated QUIC libraries (msquic and ngtcp2 respectively).

Depending on which QUIC solution you use, there is a limited selection of TLS libraries to use. The image above shows TLS libraries that curl also supports for other protocols, meaning that if you pick one of those you can still use that curl build to for example do HTTPS for HTTP version 1 or 2.

TLS options

If you instead rather pick TLS library first, only quictls and BoringSSL are supported by all QUIC libraries (quictls is an OpenSSL fork with a BoringSSL-like QUIC API patched in). If you rather build curl to use Schannel (that’s the native Windows TLS API), GnuTLS or wolfSSL you have also indirectly chosen which QUIC and HTTP/3 libraries to use.

Picotls

ngtcp2 supports Picotls shown in orange in the image above because that is a TLS 1.3-only library that is not supported for other TLS operations within curl. If you build curl and opt to go with a ngtcp2 build using Picotls for QUIC, you would need to have use an second TLS library for other TLS-using protocols. This is possible, but is rarely what users prefer.

No OpenSSL option

It should probably be especially highlighted that the plain vanilla OpenSSL is not an available option. Primarily because they decided that the already created API was not good enough for them so they will instead work on implementing their own QUIC library to be released at some point in the future. That also implies that if we want to build curl to do HTTP/3 with OpenSSL in the future, we probably need to add support for a forth QUIC library – and someone would also have to write a HTTP/3 library to use OpenSSL for QUIC.

Why wolfSSL adding QUIC is good for HTTP/3

People in general want to build applications and infrastructure using released, official and supported libraries and the sad truth is that there is a clear shortage in such TLS libraries with QUIC support.

In your typical current Linux distribution, quictls and BoringSSL are usually not viable options. The first since it is an OpenSSL fork not many even ship as a package and the second because it is done by Google for Google and they don’t do releases and generally care little for outside-Google users.

For the situations where those two TLS options are out of the game, the image above shows you the grim reality: your HTTP/3 options are limited. On Windows you can go with msh3 since it can use Schannel there, but on non-Windows you can only use ngtcp2/nghttp3 and before this wolfSSL support the only TLS option was GnuTLS.

For many embedded solutions, or even FIPS requirements, wolfSSL is now the only viable option for doing HTTP/3 with curl.

The dream of auto-detecting proxies

curl, along with every other Internet tool with aspirations, supports proxies. A proxy is a (usually known) middle-man in a network operation; instead of going directly to the remote end server, the client goes via a proxy.

curl has supported proxies since the day it was born.

Which proxy?

Applications that do Internet transfers often would like to automatically be able to do their transfers even when users are trapped in an environment where they use a proxy. To figure out the proxy situation automatically.

Many proxy users have to use their proxy to do Internet transfers.

A library to detect which proxy?

The challenge to figure out the proxy situation is of course even bigger if your applications can run on multiple platforms. macOS, Windows and Linux have completely different ways of storing and accessing the necessary information.

libproxy

libproxy is a well-known library used for exactly this purpose. The first feature request to add support for this into libcurl that I can find, was filed in December 2007 (I also blogged about it) and it has been popping up occasionally over the years since then.

In August 2016, David Woodhouse submitted a patch for curl that implemented support for libproxy (the PR version is here). I was skeptical then primarily because of the lack of tests and docs in libproxy (and that the project seemed totally unresponsive to bug reports). Subsequently we did not merge that pull request.

Almost six years later, in June 2022, Jan Brummer revived David’s previous work and submitted a fresh pull request to add libproxy support in curl. Another try.

The proxy library dream is clearly still very much alive. There are also a fair amount of applications and systems today that are built to use libproxy to figure out the proxy and then tell curl about it.

What is unfortunately also still present, is the unsatisfying state of libproxy. It seems to have changed and improved somewhat since the last time I looked at it (6 years ago), but there several warning signs remaining that make me hesitate.

This is not a dependency I want to encourage curl users to lean and depend upon.

I greatly appreciate the idea of a libproxy but I do not like the (state of the) implementation.

My responsibility

Or rather, the responsibility I think we have as curl maintainers. We ship a product that is used and depended upon by an almost unfathomable amount of users, tools, products and devices.

Our job is to help guide our users so that the entire product, including third party dependencies, become an as safe and secure solution as possible. I am not saying that we can take full responsibility for the security of code outside of our own domain, but I think we should recognize that what we condone and recommend will be used. People read our support for library X as some level of approval.

We should only add support for third party libraries that meets a certain quality threshold. This threshold or bar maybe is (unfortunately) not written down anywhere but is still mostly a soft “gut feeling” based on human reviews of the situation.

What to do

I think the sensible thing to do first, before trying to get curl to use libproxy, is to make sure that there is a library for proxies that we can and want to lean on. That library can be the libproxy of today but it could also be something else.

Some areas in need of attention in libproxy that I recently also highlighted in the curl PR, that would take it closer to meeting the requirements we can ask of a dependency:

  1. Improve the project with docs. We cannot safely rely on a library and its APIs if we don’t know exactly what to expect.
  2. There needs to be at least basic tests that verify its functionality. We cannot fix and improve the library safely if we cannot check that it still works and behaves as expected. Tests is the only reliable way to make sure of this.
  3. Add CI jobs that build the project and run those tests. To help the project better verify that things don’t break along the way.
  4. Consider improving the API. To be fair, it is extremely simple now, but it’s also so simple that that it becomes ineffective and quirky in some use cases.
  5. Allow for external URL parser and URL retrieving etc to avoid blocking, double-parsing and to reuse caches properly. It would be ridiculous for curl to use a library that has its own separate (semi-broken) HTTP transfer and its own (synchronous) name resolving process.

A solid proxy library?

The current libproxy is not even a lot of code, it could perhaps make more sense to just plainly write a new library based on how you would want a library like this to work – and use all the knowledge, magic and experience from libproxy to get the technical parts done correctly. A libproxy-next-generation.

But

This would require that someone really wanted to see this development take place and happen. It would take someone to take lead in the project and push for changes (like perhaps the 5 bullets I listed above). The best would be if someone who would like to use this kind of setup could sponsor a developer half/full time for a while to get a good head start on this.

Based on history, seeing we have had this known use case and this library around for well over a decade and this is the best we have accomplished so far, I am not optimistic that we can turn this ship around. Until then, we simply cannot allow curl to use this dependency.

How I merge PRs in curl

The preferred method of providing changes to the curl project, be it source code, documentation or web site contents, is by submitting a pull-request. A “PR”. On the curl repository on GitHub.

When a proposed curl change, bugfix or improvement is submitted as a PR on GitHub, it gets built, checked, tested and verified in countless ways and a few hundred developers get a notification about it.

The first thing I do every morning and the last thing I do every night before I go to bed, is eyeing through the list of open PRs, and especially the ones with recent activities. I of course also get back to them during the day if there is activity that might need my attention – not to mention that I also personally submit by own PRs to curl at an average rate of a few per day.

You can rightly say that my day and my work with curl is extremely PR centered. And by extension, also extremely git and GitHub focused.

Merging the work

When all the CI checks run green and all review comments and concerns have been addressed, the PR has become ripe for merge.

As a general rule, we always work in the master branch as the current development branch that is destined to become the next release when the time comes. An approved PR thus gets merged into the master branch and pushed there. We keep the git history linear and clean, meaning we do merge + rebase before pushing.

Commit messages

One of the key properties of a git commit, is the commit message. The text that describes the particular change in the repository.

In the curl project we have a standard style or template for how to write these messages. This makes them consistent and helps making them useful and get populated with informational meta-data that future versions of ourselves might appreciate when we look back at the changes decades into the future.

The PR review UI on GitHub unfortunately totally ignores commit messages, which means that we cannot comment on them or insist or check that users write them in our preferred style. Arguably, it is also just quicker and easier not to do that and instead just gently brush up the message in the commit locally before the commit is pushed.

Adding correct fixes #xxx and closes #xxx information to the message also helps making sure GitHub closes the associated issues/pull-requests and allows us to map git repository commits with GitHub activities at will – like when running statistic scripts etc.

This strictness and way of working makes it impossible to use the “merge” button in the GitHub UI since we simply cannot ensure that the commit is good enough with it. The button is however not possible to remove from the UI with any settings. We just prohibit its use.

They appear as “closed this in”

This way of working makes most PRs appear as “closed this in #[commit hash]” in the GitHub UI instead of saying “merged by” that same hash. Because in GitHub’s view, the PR was not merged.

Illustration from PR 9269

GitHub could fix this with a merges keyword, which has been suggested since forever, but clearly they do not see this as a problem.

Occasional users of course get surprised or even puzzled by us closing the PR “instead of merging”, because that is what it looks like. When it really is not.

Ultimately, I consider the state and contents of our git repository and history more important than how the PRs appear on GitHub so I stick to our way of working.

Signed commits

As a little side-note, I of course also always GPG sign my commits so you can verify on GitHub and with git that my commits are genuinely done by me.

Stats

To give you an idea of the issue and pull request frequency and management in curl (the source code repository). Snapshots from the curl dashboard from August 8, 2022.

Update

Several people have mentioned to me after I posted this article that I could squash and edit the commits and force-push the work back to the user’s branch used for the PR before using the “merge” button or auto-merge feature of GitHub.

Sure, I could do it that way, but I think that is an even worse solution and a poor work-around. It is very intrusive method that would make me force-push in every user’s PR branch and I am certain a certain amount of users will be surprised by that and some even downright upset because it removes/overwrites their work. For the sake of working around a GitHub quirk. Nope, I will not do that.

Microsoft FOSS Fund Winner: curl

Hi Daniel,

My name is Emma Irwin, and I am a program manager at Microsoft, specifically working in the open source program’s office (OSPO). One of the programs I lead is the FOSS fund.

This may sound a bit odd, but normally I send an email notice to project winners, yet someone pointed out that I have missed notifying curl of their won (and I could not find any history of reaching out). As a result, I offer my sincere apologies now! – I will happily provide notice now, although the payments themselves have already started!

The Free and Open Source Software Fund (FOSS Fund) is a way for our employees to collectively select open source projects to receive $10,000 sponsorship awards throughout the year.

Microsoft’s engineers select projects they are super passionate about. Only employees who contribute to open source projects can participate in the selection process.

curl was selected in January for $10, 000.00 provided one month, for ten months through GitHub Sponsors.

Thanks very much and congratulations!

-Emma Irwin

Emma Irwin (she/her)
Senior Program Manager
Open Source Programs Office
Microsoft

Update

Discussed on reddit.

I don’t know who uses my code

When I (in spite of knowing better) talk to ordinary people about what I do for a living and the project I work on, one of the details about it that people have the hardest time to comprehend, is the fact that I really and truly don’t know a lot about who uses my code. (Or where. Or what particular features they use.)

I work on curl full-time and we ship releases frequently. Users download the curl source code from us, build curl and put it to use. Most of “my” users never tell me or anyone else in the curl project that they use curl or libcurl. This is of course perfectly fine and I probably could not even handle the flood if every user would tell me.

This not-knowing is a most common situation for Open Source authors and projects. It is not unique for me.

The not knowing your users is otherwise unusual in a world of products and software, and quite frankly, sometimes it is an obstacle for us as well since we lack a good way to communicate with users about plans, changes or ideas. It also makes it really hard to estimate our own success and the always-recurring question: how many users do you have?

To be fair: I do know quite a lot of users as well. But I don’t know how representative they are, nor how big fraction of the totals they consist of etc.

How to find out that someone uses your code

I wrote a section in Uncurled about How to find out that someone uses your code, and these are three main ways I learn about users of my code:

  1. A user of my project runs into an issue and asks for help in a project forum – without hiding where they come from or what product they make.
  2. While vanity-searching I find my project’s Open Source license mentioned for or bundled with a product or tool or device.
  3. A user emails me asking funny questions about a product I never heard of, and then I realize they found my email because that product uses my code and the license has my email in it.

curl is 8888 days old

Today on July 20 2022, curl turns exactly 8888 days old. It was born on March 20, 1998 when curl 4.0 was shipped.

The number 8 is considered a lucky number in several Asian cultures and I figure we can view this as a prequel to the planned curl version 8 release we intend to ship on curl’s 25th birthday.

Of course the precursors to curl existed well over a year before curl’s birthday, but let’s not get into that right now.

5 years on OSS-Fuzz

On July 1st 2017, exactly five years ago today, the OSS-Fuzz project “adopted” curl into their program and started running fuzz tests against it.

OSS-Fuzz is a project run by Google and they do fuzzing on a large amount of open source projects: OSS-Fuzz aims to make common open source software more secure and stable by combining modern fuzzing techniques with scalable, distributed execution.

That initial adoption of curl into OSS-Fuzz was done entirely by Google themselves and its fuzzing integration was rough and not ideal but it certainly got the ball rolling.

Later in in the fall of 2017, Max Dymond stepped up and seriously improved the curl-fuzzer so that it would better test protocols and libcurl options deeper and to a higher degree. (Max subsequently got a grant from Google for his work.)

Fuzzing curl

Fuzzing is really the next-level thing all projects should have a go at when there is no compiler warning left to fix and the static code analyzers all report zero defects, because fuzzing has a way to find silly mistakes, off-by-ones etc in a way no analyzers can and that is very hard for human reviewers to match.

curl is a network tool and library written in C, it is meant to handle non-trusted data properly and doing it wrongly can have serious repercussions.

For the curl project, OSS-Fuzz has found several silly things and bad code paths especially after that rework Max put in. We have no less than 6 curl CVEs registered in 2017 and 2018 giving OSS-Fuzz (at least partial) credit for their findings.

In the first year or two, OSS-Fuzz truly kept us on our toes and we fixed numerous other flaws as well that weren’t CVE worthy but still bugs. At least 36 separate ones to date.

The beauty of OSS-Fuzz

For a little Open Source project such as curl, this service is great and in case you never worked with it let me elaborate what makes me enjoy it so much.

  1. Google runs all the servers and keeps the service running. We don’t have to admin it, spend energy on maintaining etc.
  2. They automatically pull the latest curl code from our master branch and keep fuzzing it. All day, every day, non-stop.
  3. When they find a problem, we get a bug submitted and an email sent. The bug report they create contains stack traces and a minimized and reproducible test case. In most cases, that means I can download a small file that is often less than a hundred bytes, and run my locally built fuzzer code with this input and see the same issue happen in my end.
  4. The bug they submit is initially closed for the public and only accessible to select team of curl developers.
  5. 90 days after the initial bug was filed, it is made public automatically.

The number of false positives are remarkably low, meaning that almost every time the system emails me, it spotted a genuine problem.

Fuzzing per commit

In 2020, the OSS-Fuzz team introduced CIFuzz, which allows us to run a little bit of fuzzing – for a limited time – on a PR as part of the CI pipeline. Using this, we catch the most obvious mistakes even before we merge the code into our master branch!

After the first few years of us fixing bad code paths, and with the introduction of CIFuzz, we nowadays rarely get reports from OSS-Fuzz anymore. And when we do, we have it complain on code that hasn’t been released yet. The number of CVEs detected in curl by OSS-Fuzz has therefore seemingly stopped at 6.

Taking fuzzing further

After five years of fuzzing, we would benefit from extending and improving the “hooks” where and how the fuzzing is made so that we can help it find and reach code paths with junk that it so far hasn’t reached. There are of course still potentially many undetected flaws in curl remaining because of the limited set of entry point we have for the fuzzer.

I hope OSS-Fuzz continues and lives on for a long time. It certainly helps curl a lot!

Thanks!

Oops, I spilled the beans

Saturday June 18: I had some curl time in the afternoon and I was just about to go edit the four security advisories I had pending for the next release, to brush up the language and check that they read fine, when it dawned on me.

These particular security advisories were still in draft versions but maybe 90% done. There were details, like dates and links to current in-progress patches, left to update. I also like to reread them a few times, especially in a webpage rendered format, to make sure they are clear and accurate in describing the problem, the solution and all other details, before I consider them ready for publication.

I checked out my local git branch where I expected the advisories to reside. I always work on pending security details in a local branch named security-next-release or something like that. The branch and its commits remain private and undisclosed until everything is ready for publication.

(I primarily use git command lines in terminal windows.)

The latest commits in my git log output did not show the advisories so I did a rebase but git promptly told me there was nothing to rebase! Hm, did I use another branch this time?

It took me a few seconds to realize my mistake. I saw four commits in the git master branch containing my draft advisories and then it hit me: I had accidentally pushed them to origin master and they were publicly accessible!

The secrets I was meant to guard until the release, I had already mostly revealed to the world – for everyone who was looking.

How

In retrospect I can’t remember exactly how the mistake was done, but I clearly committed the CVE documents in the wrong branch when I last worked on them, a little over a week ago. The commit date say June 9.

On June 14, I got a bug report about a problem with curl’s .well-known/security.txt file (RFC 9116) where it was mentioned that our file didn’t have an Expires: keyword in spite of it being required in the spec. So I fixed that oversight and pushed the update to the website.

When doing that push, I did not properly verify exactly what other changes that would be pushed in the same operation, so when I pressed enter there, my security advisories that had accidentally been committed in the wrong branch five days earlier and still were present there were also pushed to the remote origin. Swooosh.

Impact

The advisories are created in markdown format, and anyone who would update their curl-www repository after June 14 would then get them into their local repository. Admittedly, there probably are not terribly many people who do that regularly. Anyone could also browse them through the web interface on github. Also probably not something a lot of people do.

These pending advisories would however not appear on the curl website since the build files were not updated to generate the HTML versions. If you could guess the right URL, you could still get the markdown version to show on the site.

Nobody reported this mistake in the four days they were visible before I realized my own mistake (and nobody has reported it since either). I then tried googling the CVE numbers but no search seemed to find and link to the commits. The CVE numbers were registered already so you would mostly get MITRE and other vulnerability database listings that were still entirely without details.

Decision

After some quick deliberations with my curl security team friends, we decided expediting the release was the most sensible thing to do. To reduce the risk that someone takes advantage of this and if they do, we limit the time window before the problems and their fixes become known. For curl users security’s sake.

Previously, the planned release date was set to July 1st – thirteen days away. It had already been adjusted somewhat to not occur on its originally intended release Wednesday to cater for my personal summer plans.

To do a proper release with several security advisories I want at least a few days margin for the distros mailing list to prepare before we go public with everything. There was also the Swedish national midsummer holiday coming up next weekend and I did not feel like ruining my family’s plans and setup for that, so I picked the first weekday after midsummer: June 27th.

While that is just four days earlier than what we had previously planned, I figure those four days might be important and if we imagine that someone finds a way to exploit one of these problems before then, then at least we shorten the attack time window by four days.

curl 7.84.0 was released on June 27th. The four security advisories I had mostly leaked already were published in association with that: CVE-2022-32205, CVE-2022-32206, CVE-2022-32207 and CVE-2022-32208.

Lessons

  1. When working with my security advisories, I must pay more attention and be more careful with which branch I commit to.
  2. When pushing commits to the website and I know I have pending security sensitive details locally that have not been revealed yet, I should make it a habit to double-check that what I am about to push is only and nothing but what I expect to be there.

Simultaneously, I have worked using this process for many years now and this is the first time I did this mistake. I do not think we need to be alarmist about it.

Credits

The Swedish midsummer pole image by Patrik Linden from Pixabay. Facepalm photo by Alex E. Proimos.